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During the last three centuries there has been remarkable development in the area
of the identication and classication of diseases. e taxonomic systems adopted
in the 18th century by, for instance, Sauvages and Linnaeus bare no resemblance
to the modern nomenclatures for pathological phenomena. e aim of this paper
is to give a brief historical presentation, but also a critical analysis, of a number of
crucial ideas and theories behind the construction of certain major disease classi-
cations. My focus in the second half of the paper is on the most inuential mod-
ern systems of classication, the International Statistical Classication of Diseases
and Related Health Problems (ICD) and the International Systematized Nomencla-
ture of Human and Veterinary Medicine (SNOMED).e former is the ocial clas-
sication adopted by theWorld Health Organization and is usedmainly for clinical
and administrative purposes.e latter is a highly complex system of classication
which has recently been developed for a variety of purposes (including medical re-
search) and is meant to be read and handled by computers. ICD, although widely
used all over the world, has salient and well-known logical deciencies. SNOMED
has been introduced partly to remedy these deciencies. I conclude, however, that
SNOMED, in spite of its sophisticated resources, cannot completely replace ICD.
For many clinical and administrative purposes there is need of a relatively simple
system that can be handled by the ordinary doctor and the ordinary health-care
administrator.
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1. Introduction
It is dicult to identify and classify diseases.ey are not like plants or an-
imals, which have since the time of Aristotle been the paradigm entities for
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traditional scientic classication. Whereas plants and animals are physical
objects that one can apprehend with one’s sensory organs, this is not the case
when it comes to diseases. ese are diuse and oen hidden. ey come
and go, and they do so in oen unpredictable ways.e ontological status of
diseases has always been, and still is, unclear. Are they really “objects” at all?
Or are they rather processes or dysfunctions? And, in the latter case, how
should they be characterized and collected into well-dened categories?
In the history of medical ideas the term ‘physiologism’ stands for a par-
ticular attitude towards the task of medical classication. e physiologists
have diculty in ordering disease phenomena into clear categories. ey
are bewildered by the enormous individual dierences between particular
cases of the same disease, bewildered by the fact that no one case is exactly
like another. Diseases, they say, are not new entities but just variations in the
normal functioning of the body. As a consequence, these theorists consider
that categorical labels distort rather than illuminate the reality of disease. In
contrast, the ontological camp, which includes a great variety of thinkers,
opposes the physiologists in asserting that diseases are entities in their own
right: to speak of a disease is to speak of a thing, not just of an imbalance or
disturbance in ordinary physiological functioning.
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the idea of diseases as some kind of
objects, albeit rather special objects, was prevalent. e English physician
omas Sydenham, who was perhaps the rst theoretician in modern times
to reect upon thesematters in a systematic way, was rmly convinced of the
possibility of drawing a complete picture of each disease. In the rst place, he
said, all diseases should be reduced to certain denite species with the same
care as we see exhibited by botanists in their description of plants. In the
second place, all hypotheses and philosophical systems should be entirely set
aside and the pathological phenomena should be described with the same
accuracy as exhibited by a painter in painting a portrait.
In the third place, inmaking this description, the particular and constant
symptoms should be clearly distinguished from the accidental phenomena,
which may vary with the age and constitution of the patient. Disease was
to Sydenham a clinical rather than an anatomical-physiological deviation
and could be dened as a group of individual symptoms with their common
characteristics and their development over time. Diseases could be reduced
to particular species as in botany, where a distinction ismade between genera
and species. A disease should be characterized by its general characteristics
and its specic characteristics. Sydenhamwas highly critical of the chemical
speculative theories of the nature of diseases. In his day, there was a wide
chasm between the scientic anatomical inquiries and chemical theories of
the learned physicians and the doctor’s practice at the bedside.
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e rst comprehensive taxonomic system based on Sydenham’s ideas
was produced by the French researcher Fran?ois Boissier de la Croix de
Sauvages (1706–67). He was himself a botanist besides being a physician,
and in his books he sought to group diseases in classes, orders and genera.
Such an attempt was at the time quite original. In his Nosologia methodica
(1763), he distinguishes 10 classes, 44 orders, 315 genera and 2,400 species.
A modern medical taxonomist would be highly critical of all this. Such
nosologies, however ingenious they were, grouped together symptoms that
have a supercial resemblance but dier widely in pathogenesis and signif-
icance. e systems give us very little understanding of the true nature of
disease. In order to make real advances we must, the modern taxonomist
would say, gaze under the skin of the human body.1
2. Towards modern systems of classication
Modern textbooks ofmedicine describe diseases not just as clusters of symp-
toms but in all their (known) complexity and variability. e development
from the symptom theories of the 18th century to today’s conceptions oc-
curred in several steps.e rst signicant change came by way of the rapid
growth of pathology in France and Germany. Xavier Bichat and Rudolf Vir-
chowwere twoof themost outstanding gures in this development.rough
new insights concerning pathological changes in body tissues, accompanied
by the hypothesis that these changes are responsible for symptoms, the fun-
damental site of disease was moved to the inner parts of the body. e
essence of disease was now seen as being organic change, and symptoms
were seen as being more supercial phenomena. e rise of cell biology
and that of bacteriology were further signicant milestones in our percep-
tion of the nature of disease. Aer these scientic revolutions, diseases were
primarily regarded as microscopic processes—as cell reactions to microbe
invasions. Today, we are observing another major revolution, namely the
genetic one, which informs us that the fundamental site of many diseases
lies in the DNA structure of the bodily cells.
Such fundamental changes in our perception of diseases must of course
have repercussions for our classication of them. What are the things thatwe
are classifying? And can we in any reasonable sense say that the systemati-
cian from the 18th century and the one from the 19th century are classifying
one and the same type of thing? If Sauvages classies fevers—without taking
account of the pathogenesis of these fevers—and a French patho-anatomist
classies tissue changes, some ofwhich cause fevers, are they then classifying
1 For a summary of the ancient systems of classication, see (Faber 1923), (King 1982) and
(Fagot-Largeault 1989).
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the same diseases? What does “the same” mean in such a case?
We see here in a nutshell an almost insurmountable problem formedical
classication. An important medical revolution—be it patho-anatomical,
cell-biological, bacteriological, molecular-biological or genetic—may trans-
form our way of identifying diseases, and this has immediate consequences
for nosology and classication.
A comparison with regard to the sickness panorama from one age to
another is therefore very dicult. e possibilities of error are numerous,
not least because a conceptual change is not always complemented by a ter-
minological one. Let me illustrate this by looking into the history of “one”
particular disease, diabetes mellitus.
e term ‘diabetes’ is extremely old. Moreover, knowledge of the diabet-
ical syndrome is almost equally old. As long ago as 200 BC, theGreek doctor
Aretaeus of Cappadocia gave a colourful picture of the diabetic syndrome.
Diabetes is a wonderful aection, not very frequent among men, be-
ing a melting down of the esh and limbs into urine . . . the patients
never stop making water, but the ow is incessant, as if the opening
of aqueducts . . . life is disgusting and painful; thirst unquenchable;
excessive drinking, which however is disproportionate to the large
quantity of urine, for more urine is passed; and one cannot stop them
either from drinking nor making water. (Aretaeus 1972, 228)
e ancient diabetes syndrome would appear to consist of the follow-
ing elements: extreme thirst; extreme urination; tendency to desiccation;
feelings of nausea; and restlessness. Diabetes remained essentially a clinical
syndrome until the middle of the 19th century. en one can observe an
evident organic anchoring of the disease. Let me summarize this history in
the following points:
Claude Bernard, ca 1850: Diabetes is a disturbance of the normal
metabolism, in the sense that an excess of sugar is excreted into the
urine.
Oskar Minkowski, ca 1890: Diabetes is a disturbance of the normal
metabolism, in the sense that an excess of glucose is excreted into
the urine; and this disturbance is caused by a defective functioning
of the pancreas.
Frederick Banting and Charles Best, 1921: Diabetes is a disturbance
of the normal metabolism, in the sense that an excess of glucose ex-
ists in the urine; and this disturbance is caused by reduced secretion
of insulin from the islets of Langerhans of the pancreas.
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George F. Cahill, 1976: Diabetes is a constellation of anatomical and
biochemical abnormalities which have in common a disturbance in
glucose homeostasis, caused by a deciency in the beta cells of the
endocrine pancreas.2
It is tempting to regard this development as a process leading to a deeper
understanding of the “true” nature of diabetes. Aretaeus during the second
century BC and Banting & Best in the 1920s are talking about the “same”
disease, one might claim—the dierence being only that Aretaeus was less
knowledgeable thanBanting&Best and that therefore the latter had a greater
chance of discovering the deeper properties of the disease.
ere is probably some truth in such a description. e ancient symp-
tompicture corresponds quite well with themodern clinical view of diabetes
and we have reason to believe that Aretaeus and Banting & Best delineated
roughly the same phenomena. Were this not so, it is hard to believe that the
term ‘diabetes’ could have survived for over two thousand years. It would
have been much more dicult to identify any of the fevers of the 18th cen-
tury with today’s inuenza.
Despite this close correspondence between the ancient and the modern
symptom picture of diabetes, we must be aware of the idea that we are talk-
ing about the same disease in the two cases. Ourmodern concept of diabetes
is not only more complex than the old one, it is also more exclusive: it ex-
cludes a number of pathological phenomena that would have been included
byAretaeus, and identies them as non-diabetes. If we are to speak of proper
diabetes in the modern sense, its bearers must full the clinical requirement
that the beta-cells display certain specic defects. Many non-diabetic illness
pictures full Aretaeus’ conditions. Excessive thirst and urination can occur
among non-diabetics. ere can be disturbances in the glucose balance of
non-diabetics.ere can even be lack of insulin in the case of people who are
not diabetics in themodern sense—the production of insulin can be blocked
by external factors and not by changes in the beta-cells.
Briey put, the classical concept of diabeteswas dierent from, andmore
inclusive than, the modern one.is leads to the crucial conclusion that any
attempt to compare the ancient diabetes panorama with the modern one re-
quires much careful thought. ere are good reasons for drawing the same
conclusionwith regard tomany other disease concepts from a historical per-
spective.
us, medical concepts are constantly changing. To systematize diseases
must therefore be a very preliminarymeasure, awaiting new theory and new
2 For a treatment of the development of the concept of diabetes where these authors are
cited, see (Papaspyros 1964). For further analysis of this and similar developments, see
(Nordenfelt 1995, 151–173).
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discoveries. For the theorists of the 18th century this was not the case.ey
belonged to an Aristotelian tradition according to which all categories were
eternal and unchanging. e task of the scientist was to discover these cat-
egories and give them names. rough medical revolutions this classical
attitude became untenable. Within a couple of decades, all of the tradi-
tional nosological systems became unusable. Soon, indeed, the whole en-
terprise of the scientically sound classication of diseases became obsolete.
e great medical researchers and theoreticians of the 19th century—among
them Xavier Bichat, Claude Bernard and Rudolph Virchow—never under-
took this kind of enterprise.
3. Classication in the service of epidemiology
Some kind of classication of pathological entities is nevertheless necessary
for several purposes. For statistical and epidemiological work, society re-
quires that we are able to identify disease entities and nd common ways of
classifying them. Not least in the ght against the causes of death, one has to
make some kind of categorization and thereby obtain an overview of these
causes. However, among clinicians there is also a need for dening disease
concepts in order to communicate between clinics and countries.
ese needs led to the development of quite a dierent kind of disease
classication during the 19th century. I will here justmention a few elements
in the early history of this development. One of the rst attempts to create a
list of causes of deathwas that of the Swedish Statistical Bureau (Tabellverket)
in 1749. It was a short list, containing only 33 species of causes of death, but
it is worth mentioning that since that time an uninterrupted registration of
causes of death has taken place in Sweden, whichmeans that Sweden has the
longest tradition in the world in this respect.3
More ambitious classications for these practical purposes were under-
taken in England. e physician William Farr (1807–1883), an employee of
the General Register Oce in London, was prominent in this development.
He developed a system whose main categories were the following: 1. Infec-
tious diseases; 2. Sporadic diseases; 3. Accidents or external violence. His
very comprehensive classication was not universally accepted, though. In
England there was still some hesitation regarding the need for a general clas-
sication of diseases.4
For various reasons, the centre of vital statistics soon moved from Lon-
don to Paris. e leader of the French statistical bureau, Jacques Bertillon,
initiated the programme of a worldwide classication of diseases and causes
3 For a short description of the history the Swedish Statistical Bureau, see (Arosenius 1928).
4 See (Farr 1885).
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of death. In 1893, under Bertillon’s leadership, the First International Classi-
cation of Causes of Death was launched.5
Bertillon’s signicance was that he attempted to create a xed ground
for his classication. His system had an anatomical-topological foundation.
us, diseases should in principle be classied on the basis of their sites in
the body. Bertillon was conscious of the fact that there could be reserva-
tions about such a system.ere is something supercial in focusing on the
anatomical site. e site does not reveal much about the facts in which the
scientist or the doctor is mainly interested, namely the aetiology, pathology
or prognosis of a disease.
Bertillon’s point, however, is precisely that the primary purpose of the
classication is not to mirror the latest scientic development.e purpose
is instead to organize vital statistics and ameliorate international communi-
cation about diseases over time. If the classication were completely depen-
dent on the state of the art of medicine, it would have to be changed very
frequently. Bertillon’s argument is laudable. However, for obvious reasons,
he could not achieve the ultimate classication that he sought.e topolog-
ical ground for division could not be the sole ground for his classication.
When a disease has been located to a certain site, say the skin, then one
has to make further distinctions in order to determine what species of dis-
ease it is. One has to distinguish between cancer of the skin, skin infections
and allergic reactions on the skin, for instance. All of these diseases can at-
tack the same point of the body.us, ner distinctions must involve other
grounds for division, namely aetiological andmorphological ones. But these
distinctions are as vulnerable as the others. If there are new developments in
medicine that question the causal or morphological hypotheses of the time,
there is reason for reclassication.
In spite of Bertillon’s general argument, neither he nor the international
classication which followed his proposal adhered strictly to the topological
ground for division. Out of the 14 main classes of diseases that he suggested,
only seven are specically topological. A signicant class contains “maladies
générales” which have an indenite localization. Among these diseases are
tumours, infections and poisonings. Bertillon also introduced two classes
based on age: diseases of children and of the elderly. In addition, there was
a class for external causes of death, suicide and accidents.
Politically, Bertillon’s classication was a success. It was adopted gener-
ally and at a conference in Paris in 1900 it underwent its rst revision. In this
5 e rst revision of the classication of diseases and causes of death was published in 1907.
For a comprehensive characterization of the development of the classications, see (Fagot-
Largeault 1989). For an analysis of Bertillon’s and other systems for the purpose of assessing
causes of death, see (Nordenfelt 1983, 1986).
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way, the fruitful system of regular recurrent revisionwhich still functions to-
day was launched. e most important revision conference (the sixth) was
held in 1948 under the aegis of the recently established WHO. During this
conference, worldwide cooperation with regard to medical statistics was es-
tablished. All countries that had joined the United Nations entered into this
cooperative programme. Also established was a much richer classication
of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death. It is crucial to emphasize that the
purpose of the classication was now broader than before. e classica-
tion was now also to be used for clinical ends and not just for the assessment
of causes of death. e structure and the basic content of the classication
were, however, still based on Bertillon’s ideas. Instead of 14 classes there
were now 17. e “maladies générales” were split into tumours, infections
and endocrine diseases. A substantial category of mental disturbances was
introduced. It is interesting that the class of diseases of the elderly vanished.
e species of senility was moved into the category of symptoms.
In the present International Statistical Classication of Diseases and Re-
lated Health Problems (ICD 10) from 1992, the classes have increased to 22.
Some of the rubrics do not, however, denote pathological conditions. Con-
sider the classesXXI Factors inuencing health status and contactwith health
services and XXII Codes for special purposes.6
Number Rubric
I Certain infectious and parasitic diseases
II Neoplasms
III Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs and
certain disorders involving the immune mechanism
IV Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases
V Mental and behavioural disorders
VI Diseases of the nervous system
VII Diseases of the eye and adnexa
VIII Diseases of the ear and mastoid process
IX Diseases of the circulatory system
X Diseases of the respiratory system
XI Diseases of the digestive system
XII Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
XIII Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue
XIV Diseases of the genitourinary system
XV Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium
6 Ceusters and Smith (2007) have made a critical analysis of the standard medical classica-
tions and particularly discussed the ontology of the entities listed in these classications.
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XVI Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period
XVII Congenital malformations, deformations and chromosomal
abnormalities
XVIII Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory
ndings not elsewhere classied
XIX Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences
of external causes
XX External causes of morbidity and mortality
XXI Factors inuencing health status and contact with health
services
XXII Codes for special purposes
4. e dream of an ideal classication of diseases
e problemof identifying and classifying pathological phenomena remains.
ese phenomena are, as I have already indicated, not like plants and ani-
mals. One cannot place a needle in them and thereby easily identify them.
From an ontological point of view, they are not physical objects but instead
types of processeswith no clear beginnings and ends. It then becomes slightly
arbitrary how we delineate them. How should we carve into the continuous
processes and thereby dene the disease entities?
e development of the science ofmedicine ismore dramatic now than a
hundred years ago and we are getting to knowmore about pathological pro-
cesses and their aetiological backgrounds. e reasons for redening and
reclassifying diseases are now oen greater than before. It seems, then, that
one has to think in a radically new way in order to improve the systematic
analysis of this area. One may have to radically distance oneself from ordi-
nary diagnostic concepts.
e rst groundbreaking work pointing in a new direction was per-
formed by the College of American Pathologists and resulted in a taxonomy
called the Systematized Nomenclature of Pathology (SNOP), published for
the rst time in 1965. e basic idea in this taxonomy is that a disease is an





A complete disease concept, according to this analysis, is thus one that
contains qualications in all dimensions. One example is Staphylococcus
Lennart Nordenfelt 15
pneumonia, associated with breathing diculties.e disease is topograph-
ically localized in the tissues of the lung, morphologically characterized as
an inammation, aetiologically explained by reference to the staphylococci
bacteria and functionally described in terms of breathing diculties. In the
same manner, all kinds of diseases are seen as describable within four di-
mensions.
In a way, the concepts of the Systematized Nomenclature can express
much more than the traditional concepts. e mathematical possibilities
of combining the elements in the matrix are extremely multifold. Many of
these possibilities, however, are empirically uninteresting since, as far as we
know, they cannot be realized. But others await their realization and hence
also a name, and here SNOP is well prepared.
On the other hand, many currently accepted diseases are even more
complex than the matrix manages to characterize. Since SNOP is a strictly
pathological nomenclature, it does not include all clinical ndings, in partic-
ular the subjective symptoms which are so characteristic of certain diseases.
e pain and fatigue involved in most serious diseases are le outside the
matrix. It is moreover crucial to note that ICD includes a special class for
symptoms and other abnormal clinical ndings. ese cannot be classied
at all within the SNOP system.
5. e modern SNOMED characterization
SNOP, however, has had ambitious successors, the most renowned of which
is the so-called SNOMED, the International Systematized Nomenclature of
Human and Veterinary Medicine, which is now being administered by the
International Health Terminology Standards Development Organisation
(IHTSDO).is taxonomy, which has been in the process of development
for almost 30 years, is extremely comprehensive. In addition to diseases,
it covers chemicals, drugs, enzymes, other body proteins, living organisms,
physical agents, spatial relationships, etc. In 2010, it consisted of 291,000
concepts, 758,000 ordinary-language descriptions and 823,000 dening re-
lationships.
e relationships of SNOMED link concepts to each other and are of
dierent types. e most crucial relationship is called Is_a. It relates sub-
types to supertypes and is always a dening relationship. An example of
an Is_a relation is simply: tuberculosis is an infection. All concepts except
root-concepts have at least one Is_a relationship to a supertype concept.is
makes SNOMED a poly-hierarchical system. Most diseases are subtypes of
the root-concept Clinical nding but they belong to many hierarchies on
lower levels in the system, to be exemplied below.
Other relationships which are dening relationships are the so-called
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dening attribute relationships. Examples of such relationships are Finding
site,Associated morphology, Causative agent, Severity, Clinical course, Patho-
logical process, Occurrence, Finding method and Finding informer. An exam-
ple of the Finding site relationship is simply: pneumonia is situated in the
lungs.
A concept in SNOMED is either fully dened or primitive. A fully de-
ned concept is modelled as described above, and thereby specied in terms
of all dening relations. It can thereby be completely distinguished from
other, similar concepts. A primitive concept lacks one or more of the den-
ing relationships. is means that most concepts contained in the present
ICD must be called primitive concepts.
e basic analysis in SNOMED is indeed Aristotelian.e classication
denes concepts in the classical way of per genus proximum et dierentiam
specicam. Per genus proximum is the subtype-supertype relation. Dier-
entia specica is constituted by the dening attributes. But there is a major
dierence from the Aristotelian ideal in that SNOMED’s types and species
can belong to more than one hierarchy. ere are for every disease, there-
fore, several genera proxima. Consider:
Cellulitis Disorder of foot
Cellulitis of foot
e clinical nding Cellulitis of foot thus belongs to at least the two genera:
Cellulitis and Disorder of foot.
For every disease there is a complete identifying linguistic description.
One example is: Myocardial infarction disorder. is complete description
need not be the preferred expression in medical practice. In this case, it is
the shorterMyocardial infarction which appears in ICD.
SNOMEDexpands the thinking of SNOP. It does not stop at four dimen-
sions but adds a great number of further dimensions that may be required
for the complete individuation of a disease. is means that the mathemat-
ical possibilities of creating new concepts are immensely greater.
In order to see how onemight individuate a particular disease according
to SNOMED, consider the following tree of classication:
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6. Some questions and problems regarding SNOMED
SNOMED constitutes an interesting advance in relation to SNOP. It is much
more comprehensive as it coversmuchmore ground. It includes, in addition
to the classication of diseases and illnesses, nomenclatures for, for instance,
chemicals, drugs, diagnostic methods and therapies. It should furthermore
be noted that SNOMED ismeant to be read and handled by computers.is
18 Identification and Classification of Diseases
certainly places additional restrictions on the system.
A general consequence of the complexity of SNOMED is that there are
not, as there are in ICD, limited sets of classes of diseases.ere are not just
22 classes: there are at least as many classes as there are Is_a relationships.
It is also possible to construct classes based on all the other relationships.
us, in order to nd a particular disease in the network, one cannot nor-
mally begin by just asking which class it belongs to—itmay belong to several
classes, orders and genera. is is a radical step away from the classic Aris-
totelian idea of a natural classication of things. A species, according to the
latter way of thinking, belongs to one genus and nothing more.
Is the multiplicity of possible classications according to SNOMED a
problem for the theory of the identication and classication of diseases? A
rst reaction is that it need not be. It may be an advantage that there are no
privileged classications. It is crucial to know that diabetes mellitus, for ex-
ample, can be traced along various axes.is will automatically tell us much
more than if we are merely informed that diabetes is an endocrine disease.
On the other hand, it would seem that for some (for instance, administra-
tive) purposes it is reasonable to prefer a classication such as ICD.Although
some diseases can occur in dierent places in ICD too, most of them have
just one position in the system and occur under one supertitle. e com-
mon cold, according to ICD, is an infection and leukaemia is a neoplasm
and nothing else. It seems indeed as if the SNOMED constructors them-
selves are conscious of a limitation of their system in this respect.ere are
now attempts to join forces. Several expert groups are trying to match the
SNOMED nomenclature to that of ICD.
But are there more than administrative reasons for such endeavours?
Are there any deep medical reasons for classifying diseases according to
the classic tradition? I personally doubt this, given the inevitable histori-
cal changes I described above. However, I think that this is an interesting
philosophical question which requires further thought. Let us rst look at
the historical development of the characterization of diseases I briey dis-
cussed above. is development can be quickly and supercially described
as a process leading from the surface of the individual to deeper layers of the
individual, from symptoms to physiological functions, to cells, to microbes
and nally to genes.
As soon aswe discover the (probable) causes of a symptom, say a fever, in
terms of a physiological dysfunction, the tendency is to say that the disease
is basically a physiological dysfunction. And as soon as a particular dysfunc-
tion is explained in terms of morphological, in particular cell, changes, the
site of the disease is moved to that place. e disease is, as Virchow would
put it, a change in the cell.
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When the change in the cell is, in turn, explained as caused by a mi-
crobial invasion, then the disease, as in the case of tuberculosis, is identi-
ed through its microbial cause. And nally, the genetic revolution within
medicinemeans that somediseases are now characterized in terms of certain
defects in the DNA structure.
In general, there is a tendency to say that there is some privileged site
of a disease and that this site harbours the causal root of the disorder. e
“real” disease is the ultimate cause of the problem. us, this ultimate state
or process should, according to this reasoning, constitute the ground also
for the classication of the disease.
ere is a certain understandable logic in this analysis. Unfortunately,
however, it is impossible to follow this logic consistently.e obvious reason
is that with many diseases there is no such ultimate site to be found. We do
not, in general, know of any DNA defects behind psychosomatic or mental
diseases. Oen, we do not in such cases know of any physical disturbances
at all. We may also have reason to believe that there are no salient physical
disorders lying behind such diseases.
But we should not just stick to cases which are so obviously problematic
for the idea of a privileged ground for medical classication.ere are oen
good reasons for identifying diseases and disorders in general from a clinical
perspective or indeed from the patient’s perspective. It may sometimes be
uninteresting from a clinical point of view to trace the ultimate causes of
a disease (or rather an illness, when we adopt the patient’s point of view).
What is important for the patient is care and a prognosis. erefore, there
might be a demand for a classication in terms of these in the clinic.
It may of course be conceded that care and prognoses are oen depen-
dent on what is the “ultimate” disease in the causal sense. But they need
not be. With certain chronic illnesses, such as chronic pain, there may be
no known cause or the connection between the pain and the ultimate cause
may be so remote that the latter does not play any role in the care of the
patient.
My conclusion is therefore that the search for an ultimately privileged
classication of diseases is probably in vain. For pragmatic purposes, we cer-
tainly need a universally recognized and unied classication such as ICD,
but we should probably—for reasons discussed above—accept and come to
terms with its manifold logical deciencies.
7. Concluding remarks
We have travelled a very long way fromAretaeus the Cappadocian and from
the medical theorists of the 17th century to the medical systems of today.
e history of medical classication mirrors in an interesting way the gen-
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eral development of medicine. In earlier days, diseases were identied with
symptoms; with the advent of pathology and cell biology, diseases were to
be found inside the body; with the advent of bacteriology, they were seen as
having concrete external causes; and with the advent of molecular biology
and genetics, the genesis of certain diseases becamemuchmore transparent.
All of this is very dicult to capture within a classication of diseases. One
can always question where the borders of diseases lie.
However, simply abstaining from identifying and classifying diseases is
not an option. For the purposes of epidemiology, and formedical communi-
cation in general, wemust have some instrument for individuation and clas-
sication. SNOMED is an ambitious attempt to full most of the desiderata.
It accommodates the complexity of diseases and it paves the way for many
conceptual novelties. But for the foreseeable future, the SNOMED system
must be complemented with a pragmatic classication such as ICD.
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